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Abstract
Posed facial expressions of actors have often been used as stimuli to induce mental state inferences, in order to investigate
‘Theory of Mind’ processes. However, such stimuli make it difficult to determine whether perceivers are using a basic or
more elaborated mentalizing strategy. The current study used as stimuli covert recordings of target individuals who viewed
various emotional expressions, which caused them to spontaneously mimic these expressions. Perceivers subsequently
judged these subtle emotional expressions of the targets: in one condition (‘classification’) participants were instructed to
classify the target’s expression (i.e. match it to a sample) and in another condition (‘retrodicting’) participants were
instructed to retrodict (i.e. infer which emotional expression the target was viewing). When instructed to classify,
participants showed more prevalent activations in event-related brain potentials (ERPs) at earlier and mid-latency ERP
components N170, P200 and P300–600. By contrast, when instructed to retrodict participants showed enhanced late frontal
and fronto-temporal ERPs (N800–1000), with more sustained activity over the right than the left hemisphere. These findings
reveal different cortical processes involved when retrodicting about a facial expression compared to merely classifying it,
despite comparable performance on the behavioral task.
Key words: Theory of mind; facial expressions; social cognition; event-related potentials; retrodictive mentalizing
Introduction
A widely investigated mentalistic inference is prediction of a
target’s behavior from knowledge of the target’s state of belief
on, say, the location of a desired object (Premack & Woodruff,
1978; Leslie, 1987; Perner, 1991; Fodor, 1992; Apperly, 2013). But
a common form of mentalistic inference in real life is retrod-
iction of an antecedent event to explain the target’s ongoing
behavior (Gallese and Goldman, 1998). Here a common case
is facial expression. When seeing a facial expression (i.e. the
target’s behavior), we might be inclined to determine the cause
of that behavior. In such an event, a mental operation will be
set in motion to make the relevant retrodictive inference (Kang
et al., 2017). If observers (henceforth ‘perceivers’) are not inclined
to make a retrodictive inference, they will not venture beyond
merely classifying (e.g. labeling) the expression. Mentalizing,
including retrodiction, does not always happen automatically
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default, perceivers will merely classify the expressions. Here we
asked whether mental state retrodiction and classification are
distinct processes associated with dissociable neural signatures,
using electroencephalography (EEG).
Two advantages of investigating participants’ ability to make
a retrodictive inference are that (1) the associated method is well
suited to satisfying the ‘truth condition’ (see West & Kenny, 2011)
which states that participants’ responses should be measured
against an objective fact, and (2) using natural, spontaneous and
subtle stimuli that are closer to what is experienced in real-
life encounters. While target behaviors can have various causes
(Pillai et al., 2012, 2014; Cassidy et al., 2014, 2015; Sheppard et al.,
2016; Teoh et al., 2017), one such cause with respect to facial
expressions is the natural mirroring that occurs when people
meet (Dimberg et al., 2000; Sato & Yoshikawa, 2007).
To capture this phenomenon experimentally, Kang et al.
(2017) showed a succession of emotionally expressive faces
on a laptop to target participants as they were unknowingly
recorded by the laptop’s integral camera. Images of the targets
spontaneously and subtly mirroring the displayed expressions
were then shown to another group of participants, perceivers,
who were tasked with inferring which expression the target had
been observing. The truth condition was satisfied such that the
perceiver’s inference can be compared and indeed be validated
against an objective fact (i.e. which expression the target was
actually seeing). This task contrasts with methods which employ
standardized facial expressions, where the target’s expression is
posed (i.e. does not have any natural cause) and where, strictly
speaking, it is invalid to ask the perceiver to make a mentalistic
inference as to the underlying cause of the target’s behavior.
In the research presented here, we divided perceivers in two
groups. One was instructed to classify the target expressions
while the other was instructed to infer the cause of the tar-
get’s expression. The latter uniquely cues perceivers to make a
retrodictive inference, thus to engage in a deeper level of social-
cognitive processing (Apperly et al., 2006). It would not be appro-
priate to test each perceiver under both conditions as it would
be unreasonable to expect them to ‘unlearn’ the first received
instruction. It is assumed that the wording of the question and
not the inherent properties of the target faces, cues perceivers
to classify or retrodict; and we assume they might not retrodict
without being cued to do so (Apperly et al., 2006). Nevertheless,
it is important to use target faces that convey a signal such that
the task is soluble. If the task was insoluble, then there would
be no evidence that perceivers were engaging any kind of social
cognitive processing.
From the face processing literature, it has been suggested
that emotional expressions are processed temporally in a few
steps. The first entails structural encoding, which evokes the
N170 component (Bentin et al., 1996; Maurer et al., 2008; Kloth
et al., 2010). Many assume that the N170 is not modulated by
the emotional signal in faces (Eimer & Holmes, 2002; Ashley
et al., 2004). However, Smith (2012) suggested that the N170 may
also reflect an emotional categorization process (Batty & Taylor,
2003; Blau et al., 2007). Following on from the N170, an emo-
tional analysis might also be reflected in the P200 component
(Paulmann & Pell, 2009). Later, a detailed perceptual analysis
of affective significance is shown in mid-latency components
(approximately 300 ms; Cuthbert et al., 2000) and even later,
cognitive evaluation, which involves stored knowledge about the
emotional expressions, is demonstrated by the N400 component
(Eimer, 2000; Adolphs, 2002).
In terms of neural correlates of mentalizing, fMRI studies
have consistent activation in three areas, namely the medial
prefrontal cortex (mPFC) and the left and the right temporo-
parietal junction (TPJ-L and TPJ-R, respectively; Schurz
et al., 2014). The TPJ-R has consistently shown an increase in
activation during false belief tasks (Vogeley et al., 2001; Saxe and
Kanwisher, 2003) and thus is said to be specifically sensitive
to processing belief information (Aichhorn, 2006) and thinking
about thoughts (Saxe, 2007, 2009; Young et al., 2010). On the
other hand, the TPJ-L has been found to be equally responsible
for processing false beliefs and false statements (Aichhorn,
2006), suggesting its role in helping people think about the
idea of a representation (Saxe, 2007). Activation in these TPJ
regions were also demonstrated when participants were asked
to infer others’ inner states from the eyes region alone (‘Mind
in the Eyes’ task—Baron-Cohen et al., 2001; Schurz et al., 2014).
Additionally, the mPFC was also activated during social and
emotional information processing (Aichhorn et al., 2006). Frontal
and parietal slow wave activities were prominent during explicit
mentalizing (Sabbagh & Taylor, 2000; Liu et al., 2004, 2009;
Geangu et al., 2012). Activity over the frontal sites and enhanced
positivity in the late positive component differentiated between
reasoning about beliefs and reality (Sabbagh and Taylor, 2000)
and between false belief and true belief (Meinhardt et al., 2011).
Additionally, McCleery et al. (2011) suggested that perspective
taking was reflected in bilateral temporal-parietal regions and
lateral frontal regions. Late slow wave activity over the frontal
and right posterior areas of the scalp (Liu et al., 2009) was shown
after 500–1000 ms from the onset of the experimental stimulus
for belief judgments. Although the ERP components differ
slightly depending on the type of mentalizing task, it has been
consistently shown that a more elaborated form of mentalizing
is reflected in late slow wave activity over the frontal and
parietal regions. Only one ERP study reported in the literature
looked at inferring mental states from facial expressions (i.e.
Sabbagh et al., 2004). The authors identified a stronger N270-
400 over the right inferior frontal and right anterior temporal
regions when perceivers were making mental state judgments,
as compared to gender judgments. These findings allow several
possible explanations: one explanation supposes that when
perceivers were asked to guess the mental state of targets they
were genuinely and uniquely inferring the target’s mental states
through a more elaborated form of mentalizing. An alternative
explanation supposes that the experimental condition merely
involved a basic form of mentalizing (i.e. classification). However,
performance in inferring the mental state of targets was com-
pared against a gender classification condition, a classification
dimension that arguably is rather unrelated to internal mental
states. This makes these findings of ERP differences between
mentalizing and classifying less remarkable. It is not known
whether the ERP findings in the mental state condition reflect
a basic or elaborated form of mentalizing. In a related study,
Sessa et al. (2014) discovered that facial expressions of pain
selectively modulated activity at 110–360 ms over fronto-
central and centro-parietal regions while painful contexts
selectively modulated activity at 400–840 ms over fronto-central
and centro-parietal regions, hence demonstrating dissociation
between the perceptual and cognitive component of social
cognition.
Thus, in the current study we included experimental con-
ditions to disentangle ERP activity involved in basic mentaliz-
ing strategies, compared with a more elaborated mentalizing
strategy, namely, ‘retrodiction’. We expected to find broad pro-
cessing differences between retrodiction and classifying that
transcend any specific differences in processing different types
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Fig. 1. A schematic diagram illustrating the two stages of the experiment. The target looked at the photograph of an expression while his/her own expression was
covertly recorded (‘Target Phase’). The perceiver then watched the recording of the target and guessed what photograph the target was looking at (‘Perceiver Phase’); (b)
example of peak expressions used as stimuli—(from left to right) happiness, surprise, disgust and anger; (c) experimental paradigm for both classifying and retrodicting
perceivers in the ‘Perceiver Phase’. Participants saw a cue word for 500 ms, followed by a fixation cross for 500 ms. Then, the target’s expression was displayed for 1000 ms.
After that, participants had to make a response on the judgment scale (depicting Ekman-type expressions of happy, surprised, anger, disgusted and neutral) which was
displayed for 5000 ms. Finally, a 500 ms fixation cross appeared.
elaborated form of mentalizing while classifying does not, then
one might expect a more prominent N270-400 in the retrodic-
tion task as compared to the classification task. According to
Sabbagh et al.’s (2004) findings, we would expect greater activity
at N270-400 in perceivers who were cued to retrodict; and we
expect these perceivers will show stronger activation over later
components at the frontal and temporo-parietal electrodes (par-
ticularly, right temporo-parietal electrodes). Since classification
perceivers were not explicitly cued to make a retrodictive infer-
ence, we would expect activation similar to facial processing
components, specifically earlier components (N170, P200) and
mid-latency components.
Material and methods
This study was divided into two stages: the (A) ‘Target Phase’
and the (B) ‘Perceiver Phase’. In (A) targets were asked to look
at photographs of facial expressions while being video recorded
covertly (see Supplementary Materials for an extensive descrip-
tion of the target phase and stimuli). Their videos were then
shown to perceivers who, in the retrodiction condition, had to
guess which expressions the targets were looking at, satisfying
the ‘truth condition’ (West and Kenny, 2011). Figure 1A illustrates
the relationship between the two stages of the study.
Perceiver phase
Thirty-two participants (15 males, 17 females; mean age,
25.75 years, s.d. = 4.74 years) were recruited as perceivers
from the Friedrich Schiller University of Jena, Germany. Before
perceivers took part in the study, they confirmed that they
understood what they were being asked to do and provided
written consent. We used a between-subjects design to eliminate
the possibility of carry-over effects. Parity between groups was
ensured by unbiased allocation of participants to conditions. To
avoid any confound associated with experimenter effects, the
same researcher was responsible for setting up the experiment
across conditions, including fitting the cap to participants.
During the experimental procedure (see Figure 1C) perceivers
first saw a ‘Get Ready’ screen for 500 ms, followed by a fixation
cross displayed for a further 500 ms. After that, they saw a pho-
tograph of the target’s facial expression displayed for 1000 ms
(one of the four expressions and filler trials). Subsequently,
perceivers saw a photorealistic face-scale depicting Ekman-
type expressions of happiness, surprised, anger, disgusted
and neutral for a maximum of 5000 ms. This emotional face
judgment scale displayed the selection of basic emotions seen
by targets during the ‘Target Phase’. The gender of the scale
was matched to the target’s gender (i.e. a male target face
was followed by a male emotional judgment scale) to ensure
perceivers in the classification task were not unintentionally
cued about the mental state of targets. Half of the perceivers
were randomly assigned to the classification task and were
asked, ‘Which picture best represents the displayed expression?’
Perceivers in this task were told they would see several facial
expressions and were required to choose the Ekman face that
best represents the facial expressions they saw. The remaining
perceivers were assigned to the retrodiction task and were asked,
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Fig. 2. Mean unbiased hit rates for all viewed target peak expressions (i.e. happy, surprise, angry and disgust) for both perceiver groups. Error bars represent the SEM.
The dotted line represents chance level performance.
were told that they would see several facial expressions, which
were the target’s reactions to a face they had seen. After the
perceiver made a response, another fixation cross was displayed
for 500 ms. Perceivers in both groups were matched in terms of
age, gender, handedness and scores on the Autism Spectrum
Quotient (Baron-Cohen et al., 2001).
Results
Behavioral results
A confusion matrix (Table 1 in the Supplementary Materials)
shows that perceivers tended to judge targets as showing a neu-
tral expression. Thus, Wagner’s (1993) unbiased hit rate (Hu) was
calculated (a method used extensively in emotion recognition
research, see Tcherkassof et al., 2007; Pell et al., 2009; Orgeta, 2010)
to ensure that judgmental accuracy was not influenced by that
bias. Hu expresses accuracy as a proportion of both response
frequency and stimulus frequency, ranging from 0 (responses
never correspond with the respective stimulus category) to +1
(responses frequently corresponded with the respective stimu-
lus category). One-sample t-tests were conducted to determine
if perceivers were systematically able to recognize target expres-
sions. Bonferroni correction was applied (P = 0.0125) to minimize
false positives. Perceivers in both retrodiction and classifica-
tion tasks were able to detect all facial expressions reliably (i.e.
happy (t(15) = 6.93, P < 0.001; t(15) = 6.87, P < 0.001), surprised
(t(15) = 8.02, P < 0.001; t(15) = 8.96, P < 0.001), angry (t(15) = 4.30,
P = 0.001; t(15) = 5.28, P < 0.001) and disgusted (t(15) = 10.14,
P < 0.001; t(15) = 6.02, P < 0.001), respectively).
A 2 (task: classification and retrodiction) × 4 (target
peak expression: happiness, surprised, anger and disgusted)
mixed analysis of variance (ANOVA) was conducted. Where
appropriate, Epsilon corrections for heterogeneity of covariances
were performed. A significant main effect of target expression,
F(3, 90) = 22.02, P < 0.001, η2p = 0.42, ε = 0.90, indicated perceivers
were systematically more accurate for happy than angry,
P < 0.001; surprised than happy, P = 0.022, and angry, P < 0.001;
and disgusted than angry, P < 0001. Note, there was no main or
interaction effect involving the factor task, Fs < 1, Ps > 0.10. See
Figure 2. Further post hoc tests were therefore not conducted.
A 2 (task: classification and retrodiction) × 4 (target peak
expression: happy, surprised, angry and disgusted) mixed
ANOVA was conducted on perceiver response times. There was
a significant main effect of target expression, F(3, 90) = 6.64,
P = 0.001, η2p = 0.18, ε = 0.92, and pairwise comparisons revealed
that perceivers responded faster to happy as compared to angry,
P = 0.006, and disgust target expressions, P = 0.013. No other
effects were significant, including effects associated with the
perceiver task, Fs < 1.6, Ps > 0.10.
Overall, the behavioral findings did not show any differences
between the classification and retrodiction task, suggesting the
two tasks were equivalent and that they had been allocated
without bias.
Electrophysiological data
A five-way mixed ANOVA with perceiver task (i.e. classification
and retrodiction) as a between-subjects factor and hemisphere,
site and target expression as within-subjects factors was con-
ducted for the N170, P200, N270-400, N600-800 and N800-1000.
We measured mean amplitudes to quantify these components
on the assumption that these are particularly appropriate for
later ERP components (Luck, 2005), which are the focus of inter-
est for this study.
Electroencephalographic data were recorded with a 64-
channel BioSemiTM (BioSemi, Amsterdam, Netherlands) Active
Two-System. The positioning of the electrodes was as follows:
FP1, FT9, AF3, F1, F3, F5, F7, FT7, TP9, FC3, FC1, C1, C3, C5, T7,
TP7, PO9, CP3, CP1, P1, P3, O9, P7, P9, PO7, PO3, O1, Iz, Oz, POz,
Pz, CPz, FPz, FP2, FT10, AF4, AFz, Fz, F2, F4, F6, F8, FT8, TP10,
FC4, FC2, FCz, Cz, C2, C4, C6, T8, TP8, PO10, CP4, CP2, P2, P4,
O10, P8, P10, PO8, PO4 and O2. As for reference electrodes, the
BioSemiTM system utilizes two additional electrodes, Common
Mode Sense (CMS) and Driven Right Leg (DRL), which form a
feedback loop that drives the average potential of participants
as close as possible to the Analogue-to-Digital Converters
(ADC) reference in the AD box (for further information, see
http://www.biosemi.com/faq/cms&drl.htm). Horizontal electro-
oculogram (EOG) was recorded by placing two electrodes on
the outer canthi of both eyes. Meanwhile, vertical EOG was
recorded with two electrodes placed above and below the
left eye. The EEG data were amplified using a BioSemiTM
amplifier and digitally recorded with ActiViewTM (version
6.0.5) using a sampling rate of 512 Hz and online filtering (DC
to 120 Hz, low-pass). The data were then pre-processed in
BESATM (Brain Electromagnetic Source Analysis, version 5.1.8,
Gräfelfing, Germany). Offline, ocular artifacts were corrected
using a multiple source approach implemented in BESA (Berg
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Fig. 3. N170 early occipito-temporal ERPs across hemispheres as a function of target expression for the classification group only. Note the larger amplitudes over the
right compared to the left hemisphere. In the retrodiction group, no hemisphere by target expression interaction was found.
activity recorded at EEG electrodes excludes the possibility that
observed EEG differences between experimental conditions were
influenced by differential eye movements. Non-ocular artifacts
were excluded using BESATM’s artefact rejection tool (amplitude
threshold of 100 μV amplitude and 75 μV gradient). Offline,
EEG data were recalculated to the average reference and were
low-pass filtered at 40 Hz using a zero-phase shift digital filter.
After pre-processing, between 90% and 95% of all trials were
accepted and analyzed, and these numbers were similar across
experimental conditions. On average, 93.7% and 95.0% of all
trials were analyzed in the retrodiction and classification tasks,
respectively. Any differences between numbers of accepted trials
were negligible across different emotions, with averages of 93.8%
for happy trials, 95.0% for surprise trials, 94.0% for angry trials
and 94.5% for disgust trials, regardless of task.
Epochs with a 200 ms pre-stimulus baseline and duration
of 1200 ms were generated. Trials for each electrode as well
as each experimental condition/task were averaged separately.
ERPs were quantified by measuring mean amplitudes for the
following components and in the following time windows: N170
(140—170 ms), P200 (220—250 ms), N270—400 (270—400 ms),
P300—600 (300—600 ms), N300—600 (300—600 ms) and N800—
1000 (800—1000 ms). These time windows and the measure-
ment electrodes for these ERPs were chosen based on previous
research and on visual inspection of the grand averages. For the
early components with a clear peak (N170, P200), we additionally
ensured that mean peak latencies as visually inspected were
stable across conditions in the grand averages (cf. Figure 3 for
examples). Small time windows were used for mean amplitude
measurements that were centered on the mean latencies of
the peaks. Specifically, the N170 was measured at P9/P10, P7/P8,
PO7/PO8 and PO9/PO10. The P200 was measured at PO3/PO4 and
PO7/PO8. Later components exhibited less clear peaks, poten-
tially due to trial-to-trial variability in the timing of neurocog-
nitive processes, which is known to be more prevalent for later
ERPs. Mean amplitude measures are relatively robust to trial-to-
trial variability in component latency (Luck, 2005) and therefore
were also used for later components. The N270-400 was quanti-
fied at FT7/FT8 and FT9/FT10. The parietal positivity of the P300-
600 was quantified at P3, P1, Pz, P2 and P4. The fronto-temporal
N600-800 was measured at FT7/FT8, FT9/FT10, and the N800-
1000 was quantified at FT7/FT8, FT9/FT10, F5/F6, F7/F8, TP7/TP8
and TP9/TP10. Note that consecutive odd and even numbers
denote homologous sites over the left and right hemisphere,
respectively.
For ease of interpretation and readability, only significant
main and interaction effects of condition/task are reported here.
Whenever there were higher-order interactions involving per-
ceiver condition/task as a factor, further analyses were con-
ducted for the two tasks independently. Pairwise comparisons
using multiple t-tests were conducted with Bonferroni correc-
tion. For an illustration of overall ERP differences between the
retrodiction and classification tasks, refer to Figures 4 and 5,
which depict waveform data and topographical voltage maps,
respectively (see Supplementary Materials for more extensive
ERP data analyses).
Hypothesis 1. Did the classifying task elicit a stronger activation
over the earlier and mid-latency components, as compared to
the retrodiction task?
N170 (P7/P8, P9/P10, PO7/PO8 and PO9/PO10). An analysis of
the peak expressions for the N170 component revealed a sig-
nificant Hemisphere × Target Expression × Task interaction,
F(3,90)=3.75, P = 0.014, η2p = 0.10, ε = 0.96. In the classification
task, there was a significant interaction between ‘Hemisphere’
and ‘Target Expression’, F(3,45) = 6.45, P = 0.002, η2p = 0.30,
ε = 0.89. Over the left hemisphere, a main effect of ‘Target
Expression’, F(3,45) = 4.08, P = 0.012, η2p = 0.21, ε = 1.00, revealed
stronger negative activation for angry compared to surprised
expressions, P = 0.027. Over the right hemisphere, there was
a main effect of ‘Target Expression’, F(3,45) = 3.57, P = 0.025,
η2p = 0.19, ε = 0.91, but pairwise comparisons did not identify
any significant differences. Overall a main effect of hemisphere
revealed stronger negative activation over the right compared to
the left hemisphere for happy, t(15) = 3.53, P = 0.003; surprised,
t(15) = 2.14, P = 0.049; angry, t(15) = 3.86, P = 0.002; and disgusted,
t(15) = 2.14, P = 0.014, cf. Figure 3. By contrast, no main or
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Fig. 4. ERP waveforms for the retrodiction and classification groups across all 64 channels, averaged across all other experimental conditions.
Fig. 5. Voltage maps depicting the topographical differences between groups, for all time segments analyzed, and collapsed across the other experimental conditions.
The top row shows a top view map using a 110-degree equidistant projection. Middle and bottom rows show a left and right view, respectively, both using a 90-degree
equidistant projection. All maps were obtained using spherical spline interpolation. Electrode positions are also shown. Negativity is blue.
The N170 analysis also revealed a significant Site × Task
interaction, F(3,90) = 3.32, P = 0.045, η2p = 0.10, ε = 0.64. In
the classification task, there was stronger negative activation
over PO9/PO10 than P9/P10, P = 0.001; PO7/PO8 than PO9/PO10,
P < 0.001; and PO7/PO8 as compared to P7/P8, P < 0.001. In the
retrodiction task, there was stronger negative activation over
PO9/PO10 than P9/P10, P = 0.001; PO7/PO8 as compared to P9/P10,
P = 0.009; and PO7/PO8 than P7/P8, P < 0.001.
P200 (PO3/PO4 and PO7/PO8). There was a significant main effect
of perceiver task, F(1,30) = 9.40, P = 0.005, η2p = 0.24, reflecting a
significantly larger P200 amplitude for classification compared
to the retrodiction task (cf. Figures 4 and 5). All other effects and
interactions were not statistically significant, Fs < 2.36, Ps > 0.10.
P300-600 (P3, P1, Pz, P2 and P4). There was a significant main
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that there was significantly larger parietal positive activation
for perceivers in the classification task than in the retrodiction
task. All other effects and interactions were not statistically
significant, Fs < 1.15, Ps > 0.20.
P300-600 (PO7, PO3, POz, PO8 and PO4). There was a significant
main effect of perceiver task, F(1,30) = 8.75, P = 0.006, η2p = 0.23,
with stronger positive activation for the classifying perceivers
as compared to the retrodiction perceivers. All other effects and
interactions were not statistically significant, Fs < 1.43, Ps > 0.20.
Hypothesis 2. Did the retrodiction task elicit more negativity (or
less positivity) for N270-400 in comparison to the classifying
task?
N270-400 (PO7/PO8, PO3/PO4 and P7/P8). There was a significant
‘Site’ × ‘Task’ interaction, F(2,60) = 4.82, P = 0.014, η2p = 0.14,
ε = 0.91. There was also a significant main effect of ‘Task’,
F(1,30) = 6.57, P = 0.016, η2p = 0.18, in which there was more
negativity (less positivity) for the retrodiction than the classifi-
cation task. In the retrodiction task, there was a significant main
effect of ‘Site’, F(2,30) = 29.55, P < 0.001, η2p = 0.66, ε = 0.99.
There was stronger positivity over PO7/PO8 than P7/P8, P < 0.001,
and PO3/PO4 as compared to P7/P8, P < 0.001. In the classifi-
cation task, there was also a significant main effect of ‘Site’,
F(2,30) = 54.04, P < 0.001, η2p = 0.78, ε = 0.88, with stronger
positivity over PO7/PO8 than P7/P8, P < 0.001; PO3/PO4 than
PO7/PO8, P = 0.023; and PO3/PO4 as compared to P7/P8, P < 0.001.
As for task differences, there was more negativity (less positivity)
for retrodiction perceivers than classification perceivers over
PO3/PO4, t(30) = 43.36, P = 0.002. All other effects and interactions
were not statistically significant, Fs < 3.24, Ps > 0.08.
Hypothesis 3. Did the retrodiction task elicit a stronger late slow
wave activity over the frontal, fronto-temporal and temporo-
parietal electrodes as compared to the classifying task?
N800-1000 (F7/F8 and F5/F6). There was a significant Hemi-
sphere × Task interaction, F(1,30) = 5.36, P = 0.028, η2p = 0.15
(cf. Figures 6 and 7). The classification task showed significantly
stronger frontal negative activation over the left hemisphere,
as compared to the retrodiction task, t(30) = 2.44, P = 0.021. By
contrast, there were no significant differences between tasks
over the right hemisphere. All other effects and interactions
were not statistically significant, Fs < 3.07, Ps > 0.09.
N800-1000 (FT9/FT7 and FT10/FT8). There was a significant
Hemisphere × Task interaction, F(1,30) = 6.023, P = 0.02, η2p = 0.17.
In the retrodiction task, there was stronger negative activation
over the right hemisphere than the left hemisphere, t(15) = 3.10,
P = 0.007. This difference was not seen in the classification task
(see Figure 6, right half). All other effects and interactions were
not statistically significant, Fs < 3.13, Ps > 0.09.
Discussion
The present study is the first to identify differences in neural
responses to the very same faces when perceivers are asked
to classify a facial expression (that might be an automatic
process) or when perceivers are asked to determine what
caused a facial expression (a retrodictive inference process
activated on cue). Perceivers were accurate to a degree in making
judgments—either in classifying or retrodicting—demonstrating
that perceivers were engaging a social-cognitive process. The
difference in neural signature across both tasks suggests that
different processes were engaged depending on the question
perceivers were asked. In general, the classification task elicited
more prevalent ERP positivity compared to the retrodiction
task at earlier ERP components: N170, P200 and P300-600. At
late components (N800-1000), brain activity was driven by
more sustained negativity over right than left fronto-temporal
electrodes for the retrodiction task only. By contrast, for the
classification task, more sustained negativity was found over left
than right frontal electrodes. Overall, these results demonstrate
dissociable cortical processes when one engages in retrodictive
mentalizing from a facial expression compared to merely
classifying it.
Specifically, in relation to the differences between cortical
activity across the classification and retrodiction tasks, our
results showed that activity of the N170 was modulated by
different expressions only for classification. This finding is
consistent with a number of previous studies, which found
a modulation of the N170 according to different expressions
(Blau et al., 2007; Krombholz et al., 2007; but see also Eimer and
Holmes, 2002). Although Smith (2012) claims that the N170 is
enhanced when an expression is categorized as emotional, the
N170 was modulated according to the different expressions
suggesting that different structural encoding processes were
employed for different expressions. However, this was only
the case when people were classifying a facial expression.
Subsequent to the N170, we observed a considerably larger P200
response, which is involved in emotional decoding (Paulmann
and Pell, 2009) for classification than retrodiction. This finding
also supports Sessa et al.’s (2014) findings that the P200 is
involved in the perceptual component of social cognition.
Thus, it seems classification involves perceptual processing to a
greater extent than retrodiction. Larger positivity for the P300-
600 over parietal electrodes for the classification task supports
previous research which showed that parietal ERPs in this time
range are linked to emotional face processing, which in turn
involves access to semantic memory (Eimer, 2000). The present
larger P200 and subsequent components in the classification
task may be tentatively related to recent findings in the context
of socio-emotional language feedback. Specifically, Schindler
and Kissler (2016) showed a strong and sustained amplification
of ERP responses with an onset in the P200 time range when
people saw emotional adjectives they interpreted as directed
toward themselves only if they believed these originated from
another human (as opposed to a machine). Arguably, classifying
perceivers may have a tendency to perceive these emotions
as being directed at themselves (cf. Adams and Kleck, 2003),
whereas retrodicting perceivers might focus on the perspective
of the other person and what caused them to make any given
expression.
As for cortical activity in the retrodiction task, our find-
ings did not replicate those reported by Sabbagh et al. (2004).
Rather, we found a significant main effect of task (classify-
ing and retrodiction) over parietal and occipito-temporal elec-
trodes, with larger positivity in the classification task. These
discrepancies between the present results and those by Sabbagh
et al. (2004) may well be due to task differences, since their
study contrasted mentalizing with a gender classification task
whereas the present study used an expression classification
task as the control condition. Arguably, perceptually classify-
ing a facial expression only involves basic mentalizing pro-
cesses, which are automatic. Retrodiction, on the other hand,
may involve elaborated, controlled and flexible mental state
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Fig. 6. Late frontal and fronto-temporal ERP asymmetries (800–1000 ms) for both groups. Left half of the figure: note that ERP negativity over the left hemisphere for
the retrodiction group returns toward baseline whereas a distinct sustained activity over the right hemisphere can be observed. For the classification group, negativity
over the right hemisphere returns toward baseline whereas a sustained negativity is seen over the left hemisphere. Right half of the figure: the same data plotted with
ERPs from homologue electrodes over both hemispheres superimposed, such that hemispheric asymmetries become more readily visible. A vertical line is plotted at
800 ms.
At much later components between 800 and 1000 ms, activ-
ity in the classification task returned to baseline while there
was sustained lateralized activity in the retrodiction task, over
the right fronto-temporal and frontal electrodes. At the same
time, late slow wave activity was more prominent for classifi-
cation over the left hemisphere whereas activity for retrodiction
returned to baseline, as indicated by a significant task difference
over the left frontal electrodes. This sustained activity over the
later components partially supports past studies that showed
that frontal, parietal and central late slow wave activity is asso-
ciated with mentalizing (Sabbagh and Taylor, 2000; Liu et al.,
2004; Meinhardt et al., 2011; Geangu et al., 2012; McCleery et al.,
2011). Moreover, the involvement of slow wave activity for the
retrodiction task supports Sessa et al.’s (2014) suggestion that
the cognitive component and higher-level processes of social
cognition modulates activity of later ERP components. It should
be noted that the present study was not designed to perform
source analyses on the present scalp-recorded EEG data. In
addition to the known problems with EEG source analyses, local-
ization of the N800-1000 activity was unfeasible because of low
signal amplitude and the possibility of simultaneous activity of
multiple brain generators. However, our observation of sustained
activity over the right hemisphere seems to be supported by
previous imaging studies which emphasize the involvement of
the right hemisphere in mentalizing, including the TPJ-R and
right fronto-temporal regions (Schurz et al., 2014). Other imaging
studies implicate the role of the medial prefrontal cortex and
right hemispheric involvement of other frontal areas including
the middle frontal gyrus for mentalizing ‘Theory of Mind‘ tasks,
particularly when tasks involved processing of pictures rather
than verbal stories (Gallagher et al., 2000). Since there were no
significant group differences bilaterally over the hemispheres,
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Fig. 7. Voltage maps for mean amplitudes between 800 and 1000 ms, depicting late frontal hemispheric asymmetries for the retrodiction (left) and classification (right)
groups. Top view maps use a 110-degree equidistant projection; left and right view maps both use a 90-degree equidistant projection. All maps were obtained using
spherical spline interpolation. Electrode positions are also shown. Negativity is blue.
If mentalizing processes were engaged in both tasks, they can
be dissociated by the different hemispheric activity at these later
components over the frontal and fronto-temporal electrodes.
Specifically, elaborated mentalizing processes involved in retro-
dictive inferences may occur at later components only in the
right hemisphere, as indicated by a stronger negativity over right
frontal electrodes. In so far as elaborated mentalizing processes
were involved uniquely in the retrodiction task, these processes
appear to involve right hemispheric frontotemporal areas signif-
icantly more than their left hemispheric counterparts.
Based on previous work (Gallese and Goldman, 1998; Teoh
et al., 2017), we assume that retrodiction entails the inference of
an inner state. Another rather implausible possibility is that nei-
ther classification nor retrodiction involves inferences of inner
states but merely ‘matching’ behavior to a face according to a
system of behavioural rules (Povinelli and Vonk, 2003; Perner and
Ruffman, 2005). Even if perceivers in the current study did not
make inferences of inner states, at least the ERP findings sug-
gest that different forms of processing were engaged: perceivers
apparently treated the two tasks differently depending on how
they were instructed/cued, as demonstrated by the ERP results.
In summary, when classifying an emotional expression from
the face, one engages initially in structural face encoding (N170;
Bentin et al., 1996; Maurer et al., 2008; Kloth et al., 2010), fol-
lowed by a preliminary emotional analysis (P200; Paulmann
& Pell, 2009) and a cognitive evaluation, which draws upon
stored knowledge about the expressions (P300-600; Adolphs,
2002). When one engages in retrodiction, early ERP correlates
are not modulated by the different expressions; moreover, emo-
tional decoding and cognitive evaluation of facial expressions
are relatively weaker than when classifying facial expressions.
Notably, the process involved in retrodiction may be cortically
time-consuming, only appearing in later components in the
present study.
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